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I am you, when 
I am I.   
 
To stand-for-no-one-and-nothing. 
Unrecognized, 
for you 
alone.     
(Paul Celan)1
A principal concern of Levinas’ work is the face-to-face relation, “the 
proximity of person to person, the proximity of one’s neighbour, or the 
welcome we prepare for one another.”
            
 
 
2  Like other philosophers of dialogue 
and intersubjectivity (Martin Buber, Gabriel Marcel, Luce Irigaray, for 
example3
                                               
1 Ich bin du, wenn/ich ich bin.  (“I am you, when I am I”).  It is with these lines from Paul Celan that 
Levinas introduces his key chapter, “Substitution” in Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publsihers, 1991), 99.  The second verse is from Paul Celan, Selected Poems (London: 
Penguin Books), 233.   
2 Emmanuel Levinas, Outside the Subject (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), 1.  
3 Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Scribners/Collier, 1958); Gabriel Marcel, Creative Fidelity (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2002); Luce Irigaray, To Be Two (New York: Routledge, 2001).   
), his work is a sustained meditation on the importance of the 
relationship between the “self” and the “other.”  What is distinctive in his 
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reflections, however, is that inequality and asymmetry, rather than equality 
or mutuality, play a pivotal role in the relational encounter.  Levinas always 
privileges You before me, You above me, You in front of me.4
The principal task behind all these efforts consists in thinking the Other-in-the-
Same . . . without thinking the Other as an other Same . . . The in does not signify 
an assimilation: the Other disturbs or awakens the Same; the Other troubles the 
Same, or inspires the Same, or the Same desires the Other, or awaits him.
  It is as if 
transcendence magnetizes relation, always attracting and drawing me toward 
you, yet also resisting and refusing my assimilation of you.  Reflecting on 
his work during a conversation, Levinas says the following, which I will 
then restate with slightly different words: 
5
                                               
4 Anteriority – “before me”; Superiority – “above me”; Exteriority – “in front of me.”  According to Paul 
Ricoeur, these three references delineate “the religious.”  It is interesting that he does not speak of 
“interiority” or “within me.”  See Critique and Conviction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), 170.  
5 Emmanuel Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 80. 
  
 
The principal task consists in thinking of the You-who-is-in-my-world. . . 
without thinking of You as simply another Me, as though You were the 
same as Me . . . The in does not mean assimilation.  Rather, You disturb or 
awaken Me; You trouble Me, or You inspire Me, or I desire You, or I await 
You. 
When I drift into myself, you come to disturb me, and I am awakened 
by your call to respond, to be-for-you.  When I think all is well, you come to 
trouble me, and I find myself worrying and concerned for you.  When I am 
caught in despair or indifference, you come to inspire me, and I am opened 
to a world of non-indifference.  When I find myself coiled in anxiety, you 
come to arouse my desire, and I find myself yearning and waiting for you to 
come. 
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I am drawn by an inseparability that keeps me and you forever in 
relationship, what Levinas calls an “unrelenting relation.”6  I am 
“connected” by this inseparability that binds me to you, but this connection 
is never one of fusion, identification or assimilation.  Rather, it is marked by 
a separation, or a difference, or an asymmetry between you and me.  This 
asymmetrical character of the relational encounter is a key concern in 
Levinas’ writings.  “If there is not this dissymmetry,” he says, “then no line 
of what I have written can hold.”7  Everything between you and me hinges 
on your uniqueness and difference from me rather than my identification 
with you.  Levinas wants to preserve the other as unique, singular and 
separate, while at the same time maintaining a relation between the other and 
myself.  And so we are led to wonder: What could it mean to speak of a 
relation that is marked at one and the same time by a separation and an 
inseparability?  Or, what could it mean to speak of a relation between you 
and me that is also a non-relation?  In Totality and Infinity, Levinas says, 
“the description of this relation is the central issue of the present research.”8
Even though, like most of us, I know the experience of non-relation, I 
have tended to view this as a negativity, i.e., relation is good, non-relation is 
bad.  However, Levinas has helped me understand that non-relation is not 
necessarily negative, that it can hold a surprising positivity – especially 
when relation and non-relation are not pitted against each other in 
opposition, as though one term were good and the other bad.  The problem, I 
   
                                               
6 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), 295. 
7 Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind, 91.  
8 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 42.  
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suspect, is that relation gets all the kudos and non-relation never gets a 
chance to speak its voice or its insight.9
In conversations with a measure of depth and intimacy, we often 
become aware of how separate the other is from me.  I don’t mean this in a 
negative sense, because this separateness is the very thing that provokes or 
lies at the foundation of our relation.  After all, if we were all “one,” we 
would know nothing of the other who is unique and distinctive.  However, 
we are not “all one” – which means that, even in the most intimate 
relationships, there is still this undeniable and fundamental separateness that 
lies at the heart of our relational life.  Without separation there would be no 
truth, no truth of you or me; there would only be the neutrality of all-
absorbing, anonymous being.  “Truth,” says Levinas, “does not undo 
‘distance’, does not result in the union of the knower and the known, does 
not issue in totality.”
  
10  Separation is important in the encounter with the 
other because it preserves the other from assimilation or fusion.  
“Transcendence refuses totality.”  Instead of the idea of totality, “there must 
be substituted the idea of separation resistant to synthesis.”11
                                               
9 This, I suspect, is the problem underlying most binaries that bewitch our thinking – one pole in the 
relation always gains mastery or ascendency over the other.  
10 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 60.  
11 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 293.  
      
And yet, we crave “oneness,” harmony, peace.  We crave an existence 
where there is no separation, no unsettlement, no rupture.  All is well, we 
think, when all is One.  All is well when all is at peace, at rest, at-one-ment.  
All is well when all is together, when there is no rupture or dissatisfaction 
between me and you – when we can, in effect, say that “I am” and “You are” 
such that there is no distinction between us, such that we are, finally – totally 
– One and the Same. 
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We hold in great esteem words like “mutuality” “reciprocity,” 
“equality,” “inclusivity,” “one-ness.”  Maybe we need to also pay attention 
to words such as “separateness,” “asymmetry,” “difference,” “otherness.”  
Not as words of negativity (that is, contrary to all those “positives” 
previously named), but as words of excess and beyond, words of 
“excedence” and “transcendence,” more than and other-than – words that 
transcend the self-same quest for unity and sameness, words that open a gap-
rift-rupture that signal the other’s refusal to be tamed by all-encompassing 
concepts such as oneness, identity, participation, totality.  Rather, to be left 
always uncertain about ourselves, always implicated by what is other-than-
me, always entangled by you and (in this sense) un-free and without 
autonomy, always marked and defined by the singular, the separate, the 
other one.  According to Levinas, the ontology of Western thought has 
typically deadened the voice of the Other in preference for schemas of 
participation and totality: 
Greek ontology . . . expressed the strong sentiment that the last word is unity, the 
many becoming one, the truth as synthesis.  Hence Plato defined love – eros – as 
only half-divine, insofar as it lacks the full coincidence or unification of 
differences that he defined as divinity.  [According to] this platonic ontology . . . 
love is perfect when two people become one.  I am trying to work against this 
identification of the divine with unification or totality.  Man’s relationship with 
the other is better as difference than as unity: sociality is better than fusion.  The 
very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the other to myself, of 
coinciding in sameness.12
What interests me in Levinas’ reflections on the relation between me 
and you (“the same” and “the other”) is that he is profoundly concerned with 
relation, yet he distills a surprising “essence” of relation through his use of 
the word separation.  He is not interested in abstract thought that 
   
 
                                               
12 Emmanuel Levinas and Richard Kearney, “Dialogue With Emmanuel Levinas,” in Face To Face With 
Levinas, Ed. Richard Cohen (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), 22.  
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generalizes, envelops and assimilates.  This type of thinking only serves to 
diminish or reduce relation by dissolving the singularity of the other, and yet 
it is this singularity that lies at the heart of the relational encounter.  Only the 
singular, the separate, the unique, “the other” can defy the all-absorbing 
grasp of totalities.  Every totalizing move is a move against relation and 
toward assimilation.  The words which are most familiar to us in describing 
healthy relational encounters – “mutuality,” “reciprocity,” “participation,” 
“identification-with” – all these words are held in suspicion by Levinas, 
because he fears they are not striking enough to describe the relational 
encounter; that they do not let us hear the non-relational word.13
So what is Levinas doing here?  Suppose we take for granted that 
mutuality and reciprocity are important in every relationship.  “Yes, of 
course they are important,” we say.  We know in our bones that they are 
important.  We know how difficult it is to work toward healthy relationships 
that are mutual and reciprocal.  Even though we can’t (and shouldn’t) take 
these words for granted, let’s suppose we could.  I am suggesting this 
because I doubt we will hear Levinas’ word, “separation,” if we are all the 
time asking in the back of our minds, “what about mutuality, reciprocity?”  I 
want to give Levinas’ thought its best chance to influence our relational 
  They do 
not let us hear the singular word spoken to me from a “separateness” that I 
am not part of.   Levinas inserts into our relational vocabulary words we 
least expect, words like “separation,” “otherness,” “difference,” 
“singularity,” “alterity,” words that do not fit comfortably within our 
relational repertoire.  
                                               
13  While Levinas writes appreciatively of Martin Buber’s philosophy of dialogue, he is also critical of 
Buber’s account of the “I-Thou” relation that is mutual, symmetrical and reciprocal.  Levinas’ reflections 
on Buber’s work can be found, among other places, in Outside the Subject, 4-48; Totality and Infinity, 68-
69; Proper Names (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), 17-39.  
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vocabulary.  And if our relational vocabulary is linked in a fundamental way 
(as I believe it is) to our spiritual vocabulary, then this makes our listening to 
Levinas doubly important. 
Let’s begin with one of Levinas’ typically dense and evocative 
sentences.  “The same and the other maintain themselves in relationship and 
absolve themselves from this relation, remain absolutely separated.”14  Or 
again: “A relation in which the terms absolve themselves from the relation, 
yet remain absolute within the relation.”15
It has taken me numerous lines to say what Levinas says in one line.  
If I were to attempt a one-liner, I would say something like: “Every true 
relationship is structured by love.”  But of course, we all know this, so it 
doesn’t really say much.  Just like we all know that relationships are 
structured by mutuality and reciprocity, yet it seems to me that Levinas is 
holding the word “love” to its own flame; stretching love to see how far it 
  The key words here (aside from 
relation) are absolve and absolute.  If I were to translate these sentences, I 
would say something like: “I am in relation with you.  Absolutely.  I am in 
relation with you because of you.  If you were not there, if you were not you, 
there would be no relation.  Absolutely.  You count, pre-eminently.  
However, if I am only in relation with you for my sake, then we have no 
relation; rather, there is only the self-same.  Because I desire so much to be 
in relation to you, it is important that you are you.  Therefore, I absolve you 
from “myself,” from having to fulfill the conditions of my relationship with 
you.  I absolve you from having to be reciprocal.  I absolve you from having 
to make this relationship turn back on me, because I want it to turn on you . . 
. absolutely.”   
                                               
14 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 102.  
15 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 64.  
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will go, testing love to see if it really is love, holding love close to the flame 
of its own word to see if it really ignites.  In other words, is my relationship 
to you so absolutely gratuitous that I absolve you from the relation, from the 
circle of exchange, from compensation or mutuality, from reciprocity toward 
me?  This question sounds to me like it is hovering around a “definition” of 
the theological word, “grace” – absolutely amazing grace.  It evokes the 
language of gift and self-donation, a self-giving that gives absolutely and 
absolves or for-gives the other’s indebtedness.   
More and more I find myself resonating with a Levinasian sensibility 
that suffers little embarrassment linking the word “God” to the relational 
encounter. 16
[For the Greek tradition], the opposites of repose – worry, questioning, seeking, 
Desire – are all taken to be a waste of repose, an absence of response, a privation, 
a pure insufficiency of identity, a mark of self-inequality.  We have wondered 
whether the Revelation might not lead us to precisely this idea of inequality, 
difference and irreducible alterity which is “uncontainable”. . . a mode of thought 
which is not knowledge but which, exceeding knowledge, is in relation with the 
Infinite or God . . . Perhaps the attitudes of seeking, desiring and questioning do 
  Indeed, this is where the word God counts most, rather than in 
the realms of belief or non-belief, theology or speculation, grand schemas or 
totalities.  Rather, this word evokes in an exemplary way the experience of 
relation/non-relation or inseparability/separability.  Levinas ties the word 
God to the word transcendence (or infinity).  Transcendence, however, 
should not be read as the “more than” of the numinous or other-worldly (out-
there or behind-there somewhere) but as the “more than” of relation.  
Relation is driven by what exceeds relation, which Levinas calls “desire.”  In 
comparing the Greek tradition of speculative contemplation with the biblical 
tradition of revelation, Levinas says: 
                                               
16  Levinas writes: “We propose to call ‘religion’ the bond that is established between the same and the 
other without constituting a totality” (Totality and Infinity, 40).  Or again: “For the relation between the 
being here below and the transcendent being that results in no community or concept or totality – a relation 
without relation – we reserve the term religion” (Totality and Infinity, 80).  
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not represent the emptiness of need but the explosion of the “more within the 
less”. . .17
  What exceeds and yet binds relation is uniqueness, otherness, 
transcendence, infinity.  In all of these terms that find their apex in the word 
“God,” Levinas is seeking a “non-allergic relation with alterity.”
 
18  He says 
that all his efforts to speak in the name of God – in the name of 
“uncontaminated” transcendence – have led him to heights that exhaust him, 
that take his breath away.  He speaks of the “breathlessness” of the climb 
“that is as steep as in ancient times”19
Perhaps it is not surprising that “the Most High” is a significant 
metaphor for Levinas that is linked to desire, separateness and holiness.  
“Desire is desire for the absolutely other . . . A desire without satisfaction 
which, precisely, understands the remoteness, the alterity, and the exteriority 
of the other . . . the very dimension of Height: the Most High.”
 – an allusion maybe to the 
breathlessness of Moses ascending Mount Sinai.  Levinas’ language is out of 
breath, almost expired, yet it is an exhaustion that is nevertheless inspired by 
the Most High who gives breath (cf. Gen: 2:7).   
20  “Height” 
(or distance or alterity) is linked to holiness, that is, as “separation” which is 
not absorbed into the world of immanence or the self-same.  Indeed, as 
Susan Handelman notes, “separation is the root meaning of the Hebrew 
word for holiness – kedusha.”  The rabbis refer to God as Ha-Shem, or “the 
Name” or “The Holy One Blessed be He” (ha kodesh baruch-hu) linking 
God’s name to holiness.21
                                               
17 Levinas, The Levinas Reader.  Ed. Sean Hand. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 208.  
18 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 47.  
19 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, xlii. 
20 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 34.  
  Similarly, Adriaan Peperzak suggests that the 
21  Susan Handelman, Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, 
Scholem, and Levinas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 294, 282.  See Levinas, “The Name 
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invocation of God’s name expresses the holiness of God as “the ab-
soluteness or ab-solution of the Other who ab-solves or separates himself 
from all sorts of union with anything else.”22
“Exteriority,” says Levinas, “is not a negation, but a marvel.”
  
23  “The 
emphasis of exteriority is excellency.  Height is heaven.  The kingdom of 
heaven is ethical.”24  Exteriority, separation, height – these are all words that 
Levinas places in service of the ethical relation.  While these words come to 
him from a religious sensibility steeped in the Jewish people’s relation to 
God, they nevertheless always refer to the relational and ethical encounter 
between human beings.  The other comes to me from “on high” and calls out 
to me, breaks into my world as the singular one to whom I can respond and 
offer myself.  Whereas “possession is preeminently the form whereby the 
other becomes the same by becoming mine,”25 transcendence suggests an 
inability to possess, to own, or to dominate.  Ethics requires this 
transcendence in the world that orients me toward you.  The other person is 
“higher” than me, where height means this separation that resists reciprocity 
or symmetry between us. “To recognize the Other is to give.  But it is to give 
to the master . . . to him whom one approaches as ‘You’ in a dimension of 
height.”26
                                                                                                                                            
of God According to a Few Talmudic Texts,” in Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures 
(London: Athlone Press, 1994), 116-128.  
22  Adriaan Peperzak, Beyond: The Philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1997), 31. 
23 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 292.  
24 Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, 183.  
25 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 46.  
26 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 75.  
  Yet height is not power, as in “the high and mighty”.  Rather, 
height is encountered in the other person’s lowliness and destitution that 
nevertheless rises above me with an ethical demand.  “I can recognize the 
gaze of the stranger, the widow, and the orphan only in giving or in refusing 
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. . .”27  Levinas links transcendence and height with the vulnerable one or the 
stranger, who always stands outside our homely and closely-hugged truths, 
“who disturbs the being at home with oneself.”28
When in the presence of the Other, I say “Here I am!”, this “Here I am” is the 
place through which the Infinite enters into language, but without giving itself to 
be seen . . . The subject who says “here I am!” testifies to the Infinite.  It is 
through this testimony . . . that the revelation of the Infinite occurs.  It is through 
this testimony that the very glory of the Infinite glorifies itself.
  While I can ignore this 
disturbance, the stranger nevertheless remains higher than me as the one 
who always places me in the position of the “accused” or the “questioned.”  I 
lose the power of my own proud subjectivity and become instead the one 
who is called to respond, placed instead in the role of the servant, rather than 
the master.  I lose the power to say “I” and am placed instead in the more 
receptive and responsive position of “Here I am” – “for you.”  Levinas 
writes:  
29
Levinas’ religious metaphors gain all their power and vividness as 
ethical urgings.  Perhaps this is the way, Levinas suggests, “for the wisdom 
of heaven to return to earth.”
 
 
30
                                               
27 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 77. 
28 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 39.  
29 Levinas, Ethics and Infinity : Conversations With Philippe Nemo (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1985), 106-107.  
30 Emmanuel Levinas, Basic Philosophical Writings (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 158.  
 He speaks of God only because he knows 
that this word is inextricably inscribed in ancient stirrings that have to do 
with our salvation, with healing and redemption in the world, with relations 
of love and justice between us, with shalom.  Similarly, without enlisting 
religious metaphors that serve to agitate our lives toward the other – such as 
the “holy,” the “transcendent,” the “Most High” – his ethical urgings would 
be but thin veneers lacking any sense of veracity or visitation upon us.  As 
Maurice Blanchot notes: “The greatest transcendence, the transcendence of 
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transcendence, is ultimately the immanence, or the perpetual referral, of the 
one to the other.  Transcendence within immanence: Levinas is the first to 
devote himself to this strange structure . . . and not to let himself be satisfied 
by the shock value of such contrarieties.”31
The crisis inscribed in Ecclesiastes is not found in sin but in boredom.  Everything 
is absorbed, sucked down and walled up in the Same . . . Vanity of vanities: the 
echo of our own voices, taken for a response to the few prayers that still remain to 
us; everywhere we have fallen back upon our own feet, as after the ecstasies of a 
drug.  Except the other whom, in all this boredom, we cannot let go . . . The 
alterity of the absolutely other . . . a relationship to transcendence . . . because 
responsibility for the Other is transcendence that there can be something new 
under the sun.
   
Not to be satisfied, particularly in an age that is “drugged by 
immanence” such that self-sameness, self-autonomy and self-participation 
have become the new opium of the people.  We have sufficiently inoculated 
ourselves against the allergy of transcendence.  Levinas writes: 
32
Contrary to the opiates of immanence, Levinas wants to speak of the 
prescription of the divine. “Divinity keeps its distances,” Levinas writes.
   
 
33 
Of which Blanchot comments: “All true discourse . . . is discourse with God, 
not a discourse between equals.”34  To which Levinas says: “The absolutely 
foreign alone can instruct us.  And it is only man who could be absolutely 
foreign to me . . .”35  In what sense?   Because “the relationship between 
men is certainly the non-synthesizable par excellence.”36
                                               
31  Maurice Blanchot, “Our Clandestine Companion,” in Richard Cohen, ed. Face to Face With Levinas, 48.  
32 Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind, 12-13.  
33 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 297.  
34  Maurice Blanchot, The Infinite Conversation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 56.  
35 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 73. 
36 Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, 77.  
  The other is 
separate and holy, unique and singular, a command and an appeal.  The 
other is what I cannot possess or dominate, assimilate or absorb, domesticate 
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or colonize.  The other is what I cannot synthesize with myself, what I 
cannot know or appropriate, what I cannot blend or fuse with myself. 
“Correlation does not suffice as a category of transcendence.”37  The other 
is the holy one, the infinite, transcendence – a “non-relation” – and yet, a 
non-relation that maintains a relation, “precisely the idea of the Infinite, that 
is, the Infinite in me.  Or, more exactly, it is as though . . . the in of the 
Infinite signified at once the non- and the within.”38
You prayer –, you blasphemy –, you 
  
I wonder if it is possible to say that I feel you as someone toward 
whom I am always coming closer, opening myself to you, offering myself to 
you, though never reaching you – that I cannot absorb you.  Yet you are near 
to me, such that your proximity expresses an irresistible desire toward you – 
and although I cannot grasp you, I can make myself available to you.  I am a 
self-in-relation-to-you as a self-summoned-by-you.  The very structure of 
“contrarieties,” of transcendence in immanence, relation and non-relation.  
In all your otherness, you are nevertheless nearby.   
 
prayer-sharp knives  
of my 
silence. 
 
You may words being crippled 
together with me, you 
my hale ones. 
 
And you: 
you, you, you 
                                               
37 Levinas, Totality and Infinity, 53.  
38 Levinas, Of God Who Comes To Mind, 63.  
14 
 
my later of roses  
daily worn true and  
more true . . .  
   (Paul Celan)39
                                               
39 Paul Celan, “. . . Plashes the Fountain . . .” in Selected Poems, 187.  
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